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Introduction:
The European Self needs violence and needs to confront its Other to feel and
maintain its power, to remake itself continually. The generalized state of war that
continuously subtends colonial representations is not accidental or even
unwanted- violence is the necessary foundation of colonialism itself .. the Master
can only achieve a hollow form ofrecognition; it is the Slave, through life-anddeath struggle, who has the potential to move forward through full
.

consciousness.

i

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire
Present-day rhetoric of the United States government utilizes the age-old binary
of good versus evil that creates divisions between the West and the Middle East and
justifies violence against all civilians, soldiers and government officials from the
opposing side by rhetorically constructing an enemy that is non-human, evil, and
dangerous. This rhetorical tool of the binary becomes increasingly problematic when
used to suppress rebellion and perpetuate dominant power structures, for it encourages
further rebellion and conflict. What we are experiencing in U.S. political rhetoric today
is that as the dominant power structure, the government fights to control resistance
(appearing in the form of terrorism) against Western systems of oppression.
The use of the binary of good versus evil in U.S. political rhetoric, sometimes
referred to as the Manichean dichotomy,ii is a rhetorical strategy used by the state as it
attempts to reinforce dominant power structures. "The imperial machine ... produces and
reproduces [master narratives] (ideological master narratives in particular) in order to
validate and celebrate its own power."iii Those in the U.S. Government understand that
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language legitimizes and furthers power structures, but the use of binaries, specifically
those which attempt to "erase and neutralize ... differences and individualities"iv with the
creation of the enemy, will only be met with rebellion in this post-modem world that
demands acceptance of difference.
Increased subordination inherently leads to an increase in uprising, but this is not
a negative process, for "disobedience to authority is one of the most natural and healthy
acts. To us it seems completely obvious that those who are exploited will resist andgiven the necessary conditions-- rebel."v Given this light, terrorism is a healthy act of
rebellion against a prevailing system of oppression, for America colonized the space of
the Middle East through globalization and capitalistic expansion, and so-called terrorists
such as the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi,vi rebel against that oppression. For
example, Osama bin Laden speaks of freeing his people from Western oppression: "We
fight because we are free men who don't sleep under oppression. We want to restore
freedom to our nation, just as you (America) lay waste to our nation. So shall we lay
waste to yours."vii Sometimes, like in the case of September 11, the rebellion is
successful, while other times, such as the case of Gaddafi, the oppressor forces
concession. Thus, the War on Terror is a struggle by the U.S. to contain revolutions

· its
· go
l bal power. viii
agamst
Rhetoricians such as Robert Ivie and George Lakoffhave examined the use of
language of opposition to create and control various enemies during the War on Terror,
but they have also ignored or overlooked numerous cases. This paper will examine one
such case, that ofMuammar al-Gaddafi, whose reciprocal violence eventually succumbed
to the oppressor's global economic power. This case study will explore how the U.S.

3

government rhetorically constructed Gaddafi in order to control both his identity within
American society (as either an enemy or an ally), as well as the counter-violence that
Gaddafi supposedly enacted against Western systems of power. This essay aims to bring
to light the circumstances of Gaddafi' s situation that lies between the two poles of the
imposed binary and to ultimately question the faulty rhetorical system with which the
U.S. government justifies its violent foreign policies.
To achieve this, I will examine the rhetorical construction of Gaddafi by looking
at first language of opposition found in archived newspaper articles and political rhetoric
from the 1980six to show how Gaddafi was portrayed as an enemy, followed by rhetoric
from the past five years to show how Gaddafi has been framed as a reformed sinner and
an ally. I will then explore the political reasons behind this change in rhetoric, exploring
why the U.S. government chose to change the construction by which Gaddafi was
defined. I will argue that the U.S. government, having trouble maintaining justifications
for the War on Terror and the War in Iraq, aimed to validate these conflicts by placing
Gaddafi within a binary. The last section of this essay will aim to expose the middle
ground within the binary from both time periods to show that Qaddafi was not completely
evil in the 1980s and that he is not a reformed ally today. The essay hopes to provide
another example from the War on Terror of how the U.S. government utilized language
to legitimize violence in the hopes of controlling rebellion against the Western systems of
oppression and power, and to highlight the dangers of these rhetorical constructs.
Today the U.S. government relies on language of opposition to justify violent
foreign policy. Because of this, we find ourselves faced with revolt against the system of
oppression that we have produced, because language of opposition promotes cultural
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hegemony and furthers oppressive power structures. In our postmodern world,
oppressive power resides in discourse, for "discourses have become one of the primary
means of imperialism. Whereas in the past, imperialism was about controlling the native
by colonizing her/him territorially, now imperialism is more about subjugating the
'native' by colonizing him discursively."x U.S. "representations of subjects of
developing countries and racially oppressed groups are as an 'other'-racially inferior
groups are hence open to subjugation by (white) Western discursive practices."xi While
violent rebellion is the common reaction to such oppression, the more peaceful method is
to reject the binaries presented to us by political rhetoricians, and search for the full
meaning of an international conflict found within the middle ground removed by the
binary.
To achieve this, we must pay attention to what is commonly known as the
"excluded middle"xii and "resist the notion of rhetoric as a unified, coherent, and uni vocal
collection of texts stretching over time ... [we] must instead locate the variety of rhetorics
that exist at any particular moment and examine their interaction with each other and the
conditions of their production.xiii This essay will aim to reveal the 'variety ofrhetorics'
present in the case of Gaddafi using a critical rhetorical approach in my research. I argue
that Gaddafi did not undergo a 'change of character' as the political discourse claims, but
that after years of diplomacy and secret meetings, Gaddafi made a decision that was
beneficial to both his country and to U.S. interests.
In doing this, I argue that the Western world must rethink its use of binaries and
language of opposition, for binaries promote the dehumanization and eradication of other
cultures in an attempt to advance and protect current systems of power and domination
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and stifle revolutionary violence. While it is impossible to eliminate the use of these
binaries, it is crucial that, upon receiving these rhetorical constructions from politicians
via the news media, Western audiences are aware of and critical in their analyses of such
language. It is equally imperative that Western audiences become acutely aware of the
dangers of language of opposition that leads to subjugation of the enemy Other. "The
crisis of modernity has from the beginning had an intimate relation to racial
subordination and colonization ... the nation-state is a machine that produces Others,
creates racial difference, and raises boundaries that delimit and support the modern
subject of sovereignty."xiv
I must briefly stress that the complete elimination of language of opposition is
impossible, for the processes of human meaning-making are based upon difference, and it
is upon difference that binaries are structured. "Difference matters because it is essential
to meaning; without it meaning could not exist ... [and] the 'Other' is fundamental to the
constitution of the self."xv The creation of a self (such as a national identity) is dependent
upon the existence of an Other, thus the rhetorical construction of the Other and language
of opposition are inherent to the human process of understanding. This may be benign
when basing identity on peaceful cultural differences- such as: the French like stinky
cheese while Americans prefer hamburgers- but these processes become dangerous when
used to create an enemy in order to justify violence against, and subordination of, other
human beings.
While the rhetorical creation of the Other may be an effective short-term solution
in justifying violence in the attempt to retain control of the dominant systems of power, it
will fail in producing such control, for the binary will be met with resistance and revolt.
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This is a historical assumption, as the United States rests on a creation narrative of revolt
against systems of oppression, and while the use of the rhetorical framing of an Other
will always occur, the oppressors will eventually fail. The importance of this work is to
highlight language of opposition that is used to justify violence and reify power
structures, for it is this use of rhetoric that keeps us from moving forward peacefully
toward an era in which difference is accepted.

Section 1: Muammar al-Gaddafi- Product of the Binary
The use of the good/evil binary in mediated political rhetoricxvi has become a
staple for the U.S. government in justifying the War on Terror, during which we have
witnessed multiple examples of language of opposition and rhetorical creations of an evil
Other/enemy. In the original conflict, President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden
rhetorically constructed each other as evil enemies. Bin Laden defined U.S. capitalism as
evil, and Bush as the crusading leader of this power-hungry society. Bush's rhetorical
path was somewhat less smooth. The conflict began with overall indictment of the
Muslim culture as backwards, but as racial problems in America emerged from this
rhetoric, he carefully and quickly re-defined the enemy as a radical group who do not
represent all Muslims, and who are crazy and different from "good" Muslims. Bin Laden
was portrayed as the crazy, extremist leader of this group, who were quickly defined as
terrorists. The war moved rapidly from a war in Afghanistan to a global War on Terror
and finally to the War in Iraq.
Over the past five years, Americans have witnessed the U.S. government justify
violence through the rhetorical creation of an enemy, today labeled as the 'terrorist,'
(including those labeled as a supporter terrorists, the definition of which ranges from
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allowing labeled terrorists to stay in a country, to the possession of nuclear weapon
technology). While rhetoricians have examined the implications of this language from a
number of angles and instances, the essential binary remains constructed and often
uncontested or overlooked within our culture's language.
One example of language of opposition that remains relatively unexamined is the
rhetorical construction of the leader of Libya, Muammar al-Gaddafi- particularly the
rhetorical relocation of Gaddafi from one side of the binary (evil) to the other (good) over
the past ten years. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, political discourse portrayed
Gaddafi as an other/evil enemy and as a primary sponsor and supporter of international
terrorism. During the period, Gaddafi incurred numerous economic sanctions and
military attacks. In 1999, economic problems from imposed sanctions forced Gaddafi to
attempt to re-enter the international fold, but the U.S. government would not remove
sanctions without Gaddafi's promise to disband nuclear intelligence and repay the
families of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.xvii When Gaddafi finally gave into
Western requests in 2003, sanctions were lifted and the political discourse surrounding
Gaddafi changed, discursively leading to the removal of Libya from the State Sponsors of
Terrorists listxviii in May 2006.
This section of the essay will first examine political and journalistic rhetoric from
the 1980s that discursively portrayed Gaddafi as an evil enemy, thus justifying violence
against him and his people. I will then examine the same kind of rhetoric from the past
five or so years that portrayed Gaddafi as a man who underwent a change of character to
become the U.S government's number one ally in the Middle East.

The Construction of Gaddafi as an Evil Other
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Throughout the 1970s, Western leaders associated Gaddafi and his regime with
terrorist activities, and by the mid-1980s, Journalists mirrored the rhetoric of Western
politicians that portrayed Gaddafi as the principal financier of international terrorism.
The U.S. government tied Gaddafi's regime to acts of terrorism including the 1972
Munich Olympics killing oflsraeli athletes, the 1973 assassination of the U.S.
ambassador to Sudan, and the 1975 raid of a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, led by the international terrorist known as Carlos
the Jackal. The U.S. government also accused Gaddafi of supporting the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Japanese Red Army, and
others.xix While the list of Gaddafi's supposed infractions goes on, I will narrow my
examination to public discourse surrounding operation El Dorado Canyon to illuminate
language used to justify state violence and further Western systems of power.
In 1986, Western politicians blamed Qaddafi and his government for an attack on
a discotheque in Berlin that killed two U.S. servicemen, after which the U.S. Navy
invaded the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean Sea. Libya claimed the gulf as territorial
waters, and string of military conflicts ensued.xx On April 14, in what was dubbed
operation El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. government bombed the Libya's capitol, Tripoli,
striking Gaddafi's home and killing a number of civilians including Gaddafi's young
adopted daughter. The U.S. government had to justify these actions, so "the
administration charged that its leader, Mohammar Qaddafi, was organizing terrorist
strikes on Americans and U.S. interests abroad."xxi The news media disseminated this
political rhetoric to portray Operation El Dorado Canyon as the necessary eradication of
an irrational evil enemy, allowing for the motivations behind violent acts to remain
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unchallenged. "When it crune to defining the problem, the media overwhelmingly
favored the administration,"xxii thus journalists allowed the government to disseminate
language of opposition to the public without question. While the journalists failed to
perform their duty as the watchdog of the government, the audience (Western civilians),
also failed to question this language.
The discourse surrounding Gaddafi in the 1980s exemplifies the use of the
rhetorical arsenal necessary to create an enemy using a good versus evil binary. There
are a number of rhetorical tools commonly used in this process including: the creation of
the self/audiencexxiii, the process of dehumanization, and the "three topoi" xxiv as theorized
by Robert Ivie. The placement of Gaddafi as the evil Other within the binary of good
versus evil, simplified the justification of violence against him and his supporters. As Dr.
Rosa Eberly explains, the designation of an Other as evil is dangerous because "while
'evil' might function for some audiences as an answer to forensic questions, it does little
to provide guidance for deliberative questions ... claims about evil shut down
deliberation."xxv
The binary of good/evil becomes harmful when used to rhetorically create an
enemy because when political rhetoric constitutes a person as the evil Other, the self (in
this case the American/Western audience of this rhetoric) will aim for the complete
eradication of the evil, even through violent means. This rhetoric also positions the
audience as striving for goodness at the risk of becoming evil, thereby forcing the
audience to fight evil while satisfyingly positioning them as good.
In 2000, journalist Ugboaja Ohaegbulam explained how this discourse functions, its
implications, and how Gaddafi had been placed within a binary at the aim of creating an
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enemy:
Over the past three decades, casting leaders of foreign countries as Hitler's and
their countries as evil empires has become the staple of U.S. foreign policy. U.S.
Administrations ... have tended to use such characterizations as a shorthand
justification for a number of invasions, bombing sorties, and military buildups.
Conducting foreign policy in this fashion, however, can have serious drawbacks.
Castigating foreign leaders and America's enemies as evil personifies raises the
stakes of operations and leaves little room for a nuanced and often more practical
approach to conflict resolution. Americans troubled relations with Libya have
been a victim of this approach for about thirty years. ,,xxvi
A common rhetorical tool used to create an enemy is known as "imperial
savagery."xxvii In this method, the political rhetorician portrays a culture as backwards
and in need of saving. John R. Butler defines this type of rhetoric as, "the development
of a primitive society that does not appreciate its problems or the benevolent intentions of
those who wish to help [and] the identification of a solution that constitutes bringing
civilization to a troubled culture."xxviii James Bovard, a writer for the Future of Freedom

Foundation, discusses the Reagan Administration's use of this tactic when it proposes
that the Libyan people are trapped by Gaddafi and need to be saved by America. At the
same time, Bovard argues, the U.S. government warns the Libyan people that Qaddafi's
evil acts implicate them as enemies to the Western world:
While the U.S. government insisted that the killing of civilians was an accident, a
Voice of America broadcast that night warned the Libyan people, "The people of
the U.S. bear Libya and its people no enmity or hatred. However ... so long as
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Libyans obey his orders, then they must accept the consequences. Colonel
Qaddafi is your tragic burden. xxix
Another example of imperial savagery appeared in a speech Reagan gave the night
before Operation El Dorado Canyon when he said "I'm sure that today most Libyans are
ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism
around the world. The Libyan people are a decent people caught in the grip of a
tyrant. ,,xxx
Dehumanization is another primary component of the process of enemy-making,
for the construction of the enemy as evil and non-human justifies killing the enemy. Ivie
refers to the result ofthis rhetoric as a 'just' or justified war. He explains that "warfare
is characterized as a means of last resort, a necessary evil forced upon a reluctant nation
by the aggressive acts of an enemy bent upon the alienation of humarikind from their
liberties."xxxi The self/good side, in fighting against an aggressor, is freed from
responsibility for the conflict and has been forced to war as the victim of an attack by
evil. This "victimage rhetoric"xxxii allows for complete justification for war through the
projection of the aggressor as a savage with irrational desires for domination. The use of
this topoi was seen clearly when Reagan stated that "Colonel Qadhafi had engaged in acts
of international terror, acts that put him outside the company of civilized men," and said
that the bombing at La Belle Discotheque was a "monstrous brutality" that was "but the
latest act in Colonel Qadhafi's reign of terror.""""iu This language portrays Gaddafi as a
non-human, for he is not like 'civilized men,' thus constructing him as an enemy who can
be killed without remorse.
Ivie lays out the three topoi (means of justification) against the enemy, all of which
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the U.S. government applied to Gaddafi both in relation to his own actions and through
his associations with other 'enemies' such as terrorists, and to his possession of 'weapons
of mass destruction.' The first oftopos, 'force versus freedom,' posits that everyone has
a right to freedom and that the good side can offer that freedom. In this construction, a
political rhetorician constructs the good side as fighting in defense of freedom against an
enemy who is forcefully threatening to remove said freedoms, thereby forcing the self to
retaliate with even greater force, and so on. During Operation El Dorado Canyon,
Reagan argues that the U.S. and its allies are fighting to defend the freedom that Gaddafi
is forcefully trying to destroy, so the U.S. must in tum use force to protect that freedom:
Our friends and allies in Europe ... understand better than most that there is no
security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil. It must be the core of Western
policy that there be no sanctuary for terror. And to sustain such a policy, free men
and free nations must unite and work together.xxxiv
By declaring that not just America, but all of its allies in Europe, are fighting
for freedom, Reagan is creating an enemy who threatens an entire way of life. This
enemy is dangerous not only to the U.S., but to all who are good who defend security and
safety, therefore the eradication of this enemy is all the more justified.
The second topos is the construction of "irrational versus rational,"xxxv in which the
enemy and his ideas are irrational because hexxxvi is crazy and non-human, while the
selfs ideas are rational, as he is sane and human. This method is employed in an article
in which the bureau chief of The New York Times in Madrid, Edward Schumacher,
portrayed Gaddafi as a crazy person. "Many have wondered: is Qaddafi mad? A
megalomaniac? Otherwise respectable psychologists have tried to analyze him from

13

afar ... While many of those around him are corrupt, Qaddafi by all accounts is not,
making him the worst sort of dictator: a true-believing one."xxxvii By positioning him as
crazy by all Western standards, and then labeling him as a dictator, who by definition is
contrary to Democracy and therefore is an enemy, Schumacher reflects the perspective
intended by the government that Gaddafi is indeed an irrational evil enemy. This topos
suggests that it is the job of the self to contain and tame the other because they are too
irrational to fix themselves, which we see when Schumacher said that psychologists
(assumed to be sane/Western) have studied this Other-a 'madman' who truly believes
that he is an honorable revolutionary.
The language in a 1986 Newsweek article also shows the use of the "irrational
versus rational"xxxviii topos when it quotes former Secretary of State George Shultz as
encouraging a coup in Libya, and quotes an unnamed U.S. Official as saying that "the
problem is Kaddafi, not Libya. nxxxix The language in this article assumes that Gaddafi is
a problem without question, saying Reagan's advisors "believe it [eliminating Kaddafi]
will stop Libya's troublemaking." The article concludes by stating that:
Trying to reason with him [Kaddafi] has failed ... and organizing sanctions has
proved either impossible or ineffective. With all other possibilities blocked,
administration hands say, they decided months ago that military pressure was the
only choice left. 'The debate about options,' says one senior official, 'ended late
last year. ,,,xi
This article argues that rational methods of peace-making such as 'reason' or 'sanctions'
have failed because Gaddafi is an irrational being, leaving the government with no other
choice but to use violence to topple this non-human threat.
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The third topos defined by Ivie is "aggression versus defense,"xli which assumes
that the enemy was the voluntary and initial aggressor, and we (the self) are involuntary
and defensive in our response. A New York Times article from 1986 begins with, "Col.
Muammar el-Qaddafi is spreading death beyond Libya's borders again,"xlii and refers to
Gaddafi's involvement in Chad as "naked aggression."xliii The journalist then portrayed
the U.S. government as the needed defenders of good in the world, thus portraying it as a
hero against the enemy: "The Reagan Administration's response is as welcome as it is
swift. It is reassuring to see that, despite the Iran-contra affair, Washington can still
respond to a crisis in a way that appears timely, measured and open."xliv
In a speech given the night before Operation El Dorado Canyon, Reagan uses this
topos most often of the three. He stated that "self-defense is not only our right, it is our
1
duty,"' • and that Americans wanted a peaceful solution, but that Gaddafi the aggerssor

did not allow it:
We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before
resorting to the use of force -- and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public
condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None
succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy
of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. xlvi
This statement rhetorically constructs 'we Americans' as the good, humane, and rational
side who tried to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner, but because of Gaddafi's
irrational and aggressive tactics, we were forced to use violence in order to conquer this
extremely dangerous threat.
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All three topoi of justification allow for the dehumanization of the enemy in such
a way that absolves the self of any responsibility for the violence that comes with the
conflict. Through this process, the call to war is portrayed as a last option; a final resort
in saving the good in the world (the self) that is being threatened by evil. This rhetorical
construction became the foundation of the American War on Terror, and it continues to
be relevant to all who are portrayed as the evil Other by association with groups of
peoples or activities already constituted in the American identity as evil.
In the 1980s, political rhetoricians constructed Gaddafi as the evil enemy using
common rhetorical tools of enemy-making. I will now examine to current discourse that
constructs Gaddafi as a person who, due to a change of character (as opposed to a change
in policy), has moved to the 'good' side of the binary by attaining the identity of the self.
When reading this next section, keep in mind the tools of dehumanization and the three
topoi discussed in the previous section, for their use in the past construction of Gaddafi as
an enemy is crucial to the relocation of Gaddafi from enemy to ally. This narrative of an
other-turned-self highlights Gaddafi's human nature by showing how he has undergone a
change of heart, thus providing proof that he has moved from the side of the
inhumane/irrational/aggressive/evil other to the side of the humane/rational/passive/good
self.
The Construction of Gaddaji as a Self

In 2003, the U.S. government announced to Western audiences that Gaddafi
planned to end his nuclear weapons program. From 2003 to the removal of Libya from
the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006, Western politicians began to change
their rhetoric surrounding Gaddafi in the hopes that he would smoothly transition from
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enemy to ally in the eyes of the Western audiences. Using the same processes that were
used when creating Gaddafi as an enemy, politicians were able to construct Gaddafi as an
Other who has, with the help of the civilized Western world, been reformed to become
less like an enemy (irrational, inhumane, crazy) and more like the self (rational, human,
sane). In addition to political rhetoric, I will examine newspaper articles in which
journalists' construction of Gaddafi mirrors that of the politicians in showing the
successful relocation of Gaddafi within the good/evil binary.
An important rhetorical tool in the creation of an enemy is the creation of the self,

which appears when Gaddafi is framed to have "decided" to tum away from activities
identified with the "other" such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and join
the identity of the "self." John M. Murphy explains that political rhetoricians provided a
construction "through which the audience was to interpret its identity. Simply put, we
were good and they were evil." 1 This process was applied to Gaddafi, for when
associated with terrorism and WMD's, he was an enemy, a non-human and an Other.
When language constitutes him as someone who was an enemy in the past, it implies that
he is by default now a self. Gaddafi's movement from one side of the other is primarily
constructed through language that shows him to be removing his identity from things that
we regularly identify in tandem with enemies or otherness, including terrorism and
nuclear proliferation. By removing these aspects from Gaddafi's identity, it is easy to
construct him as an ally.
A BBC article from 2006 clearly shows how Gaddafi has become more like the
self in noting his humanity (an important aspect of self-ness): "looking and sounding
increasingly weary, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, 64, seems to have come to terms with
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his own mortality."xlvii The article portrays him as one who was once an other: "he
[Gaddafi] has ruled his country in the style of the most eccentric of absolute monarchs
imaginable," but then shows his change of character: "with the wisdom of years perhaps,
the Libyan leader has tried hard to tum a new page and clean up the image of his country
as a haven for revolutionaries."xlviii The article shows that Gaddafi has been rewarded for
his choice to become more like the Western self:
the decision of the U.S. to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya marks the
crowning success of his efforts to have his country accepted back into the
international community. He would clearly like a skeptical world to see this as
final proof that he and his country have cast aside their rebellious streak."xlix
In this article, Gaddafi is shown as a formerly crazy revolutionary who has come to his
senses and accepted the correct way of life; the life of the Western self. Another BBC
article in 2004 says that Gaddafi was once "one of the West's bogeymen," who has
"turned into, if not exactly a new friend, then someone the West is doing business with," 1
providing discursive proof that Gaddafi is no longer the evil other of the 1970s and 80s.

A BBC article from September 2005 called Libya the "Washington fairytale," in
reference to Gaddafi's decision to end Libya's nuclear weapons program. The article
states that "once seen in Washington as a typical 'rogue state,' Libya has now definitively
come in from the cold." The article calls Libya "a country once condemned for its
involvement in international terrorism and for having clandestine weapons programmes,"
again showing a previous (and now non-existent) identity associated with concepts that
define Otherness. This language highlights the idea that Gaddafi was an enemy in the
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past, implying that he is no longer such thus, according to the binary, he has become
more like the self.
The article again emphasizes Gaddafi's past identity as an enemy, calling Gaddafi
a "maverick veteran" and highlights his change of character, saying that Arabs were "as
surprised as anyone when Libya admitted responsibility for the Lockerbie and French
airliner bombings," Ii showing that his change of character was unexpected due to his past
evilness, thus highlighting that he has truly changed. Journalist Anthony Layden said
that Gaddafi chose "a radical change of direction," 1ii emphasizing Gaddafi's move from
the side of the enemy/other to the side of the self, for an enemy can not be like the self
unless his previous moral deficiencies (upon which or justification of violence against
him rested) have been removed or remedied.
While many journalists reflected the language of the political rhetoricians, one
New York Times writer makes note of, and denounces, the change in political rhetoric.
He shows Gaddafi' s past status as an enemy by referring to Gaddafi as, "a onetime bitter
enemy [that] the U.S. government had tired for years to isolate, topple, or kill,"1iii thus
noting Gaddafi's past location within the binary. The article quoted Noman Benotman,1iv
as saying that "anyone who is an enemy ofKadafi is also an enemy of the United States,"
showing how Gaddafi has literally become part of the self as an ally to the U.S.
government. The article then quoted Ashur Shamis,1v as recognizing the change in
Western rhetoric, saying that "Kadafi was considered to be a dictator and terrorist, and
Libya was a rogue regime ... suddenly, everything has changed. Kadafi used to be public
enemy No. 1 and now you are arresting people based on his information... " 1vi While this
article ultimately questions the change of rhetoric, it still uses language of opposition, and
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clearly shows that Gaddafi has moved from one side of the binary (enemy) to the other
(ally).
In addition, Gaddafi is shown to be so much of a self that he can serve as a model
for helping other enemies to become good. "The US Assistant Secretary of State, David
Welch ... explicitly cited Libya as an important model as Washington pushes for change
in the policy of other countries, notably Iran and North Korea."lvii This political rhetoric
shows that Gaddafi and Libya have been reformed, or saved, by the Western self, and
provides a model for the salvation of other so-called others. Libya provides the U.S.
government with a clear example of the success of its policies, and can be used to help
other international goals, such as controlling nuclear weapon knowledge In Iran. The
argument that "the experience with Libya shows that seemingly intractable problems can
be grappled with by diplomatic means," 1viii allows the U.S. government to continue
policies that 'encourage' other enemies to become "good" members of the global
community. Today and in the future, the supposed success in Libya provides more fuel
for the fodder of the U.S. government to continue implementing anti-nuclear policies
abroad, thus violence to this end is again justified.
On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced the removal of Libya from America's
list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, officially declaring Gaddafi an ally to the Western
cause, bringing new implications to the aforementioned rhetoric. Upon doing so, Bush
discussed Gaddafi's change of character, making clear the idea that Gaddafi was now to
be identified as an ally:
Colonel Gaddafi ... communicated to us his willingness to make a decisive change
in the policy of his government. At the direction of Colonel Gaddafi himself,
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Libyan officials have provided U.S. and British officers with documentation
on that country's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs and
activities. With today's announcement by its leader, Libya has begun the process
of rejoining the community of nations. As the Libyan government takes these
essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness, its good faith will be returned.
Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time,
achieve far better relations with the United States. The Libyan people are heirs to
an ancient and respected culture, and their country lies at the centre of a vital
region. As Libya becomes a more peaceful nation, it can be a source of stability
in Africa and the Middle East ... as we have found with other nations, old
hostilities do not need to go on forever. 1ix
During this speech, Bush rhetorically constructed Gaddafi as a self, an ally, and a friend.
He spoke of Gaddafi as if Gaddafi were a rational human being. He highlights this with
the comment 'at the direction of Gaddafi himself,' implying that Gaddafi's move was
unexpected due to his past construction as an enemy, and that he has changed from that
construction. Bush uses language that adds humanity to Libya, emphasizing it's cultural
heritage as well as it's potential for good in the unstable region. This discourse prepares
the American audience for a change in rhetoric, for it begins to portray Gaddafi, Libya,
and the people of Libya as associated with the self, the good, and the ally.

It has become clear, as will be explained in the next section, that Gaddafi's move to
the self side of the binary was a prelude to his removal from the list. The narrative of an
enemy turned ally over a six-year process should seem shaky (at the least) to the
discerning audience. How could an irrational evil enemy suddenly become an ally to the
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West in a short six years? Gaddafi has not turned from evil to good-- the public
discourse around him changed in tandem with political motivations of the Western world.
The next section of this essay will explore the political motivations that in part provide
explanations for these changes.

Section 2: Political Motives Behind tile Rhetorical Tum
In the previous section, I explored rhetoric from the late 1980s, and then from 2003
to 2006, to show the 'before and after' effect of language of opposition. What the
audience perceives today is a man who used to be evil in nature (on one side of the
binary) who changed in nature to become good, like the self (to the other side of the
binary). This relocation appears seamless, as if Gaddafi woke up one morning and
decided that he had been wrong, and needed to change his ways. But what happened
from the late 1980s to 2003? This time period provides us with the excluded middle, the
ignored 'multiple rhetorics' systematically removed by the binary of good versus evil.
The process of a change in international policy concerning Gaddafi actually began
in 1999, when Libya pledged its commitment to fighting Al-Qaeda and offered to open
up its weapons program to international inspection after secret meetings with the Clinton
administration. Evidence that Gaddafi's policy change began in 1999 was found in an
official State Department document that stated: "We have seen definite changes in
Libya's behavior, specifically in declining support for terrorism and increasing support
1

for peace processes in the Middle East and Africa." x Following the attacks of September
11, 2001, Gaddafi was one of the first Muslim leaders to condemn the actions of the AlQaeda bombers, again attempting to enter the global community.
The change in political rhetoric did not occur until two full years later, when it was
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beneficial to the U.S. government. Three political motives arose in 2003: the need for
justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the need for justification of (and proof of the
legitimacy of) the War on Terror, and oil prices. The reasons that Gaddafi's initial
attempted change in policy, as well as the reasons behind the U.S. government's choice
to wait until 2003 to allow these changes, will be discussed at greater length in this
section of the essay.
The U.S. Government's decision to change the rhetoric surrounding Gaddafi and
finally allowing him to disband his nuclear programs helped to justify the War in Iraq. In
order to rationalize the violence of and motives for the widely criticized War in Iraq, the
Bush Administration discursively portrayed Gaddafi as giving up weapons of mass
destruction just after Saddam Hussein was attacked and overthrown, implying that the
War in Iraq scared Gaddafi into concession. In the Financial Times, Martin lndyk brings
much of this to view:
Embarrassed by the failure to find Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction, President George W. Bush is trying to find another WMD-related
justification for he pre-emptive war on Iraq. Bush administration spokesmen have
been quick to portray Libya's December decision to abandon WMD programs as
the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq." 1xi
At the State of the Union address in January 2004, President Bush spoke solely
about the War in Iraq, and implied a direct connection between U.S.'s involvement in
Iraq and Gaddafi's decision to give up his nuclear programs:
Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better.
Last month, the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all
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of his regime's weapons of mass destruction programs, including a uranium
enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Colonel Qadafi correctly judged that his
country would be better off and far more secure without weapons of mass
destruction. Nine Months of intense negotiations ... succeeded with Libya, while
12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy
to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of
America"1xii
Indyk says that, "the implication is clear. Get rid of one dictator because of his
supposed WMD programs and others will be so afraid that they will voluntarily abandon
their weapons programs. Therefore, even if no WMD's were found in Iraq, we still made
the world a safer place."1xiii This can be seen when Bush states that Libya 'would be
better off and more secure,' referring to the fact that Iraq was bombed and the leader
overthrown because of a suspicion of similar weapons programs. In addition, Bush
draws a parallel to Saddam Hussein by referring to Gaddafi's government as a 'regime.'
Bush concludes by stating that America has made the world a better place, and has
redeemed its dependability in the international community.
Vice President Dick Cheney more directly pointed to the connection between
Gaddafi and the War in Iraq, stating that Gaddafi's decision was "one of the great byproducts ... of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just five days after we captured
Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar Qaddafi came forward and announced that he was going to
surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States."1xiv Here, Cheney directly
justifies the widely questioned violence of Iraq and Afghanistan, calling Gaddafi's
decision 'one of the great by-products' of the violence. The violence was justified when
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it supposedly lead to an evil enemy deciding to come to the 'good' side and give up his
evil ways to become like the self.
The discourse that Gaddafi was scared or coerced into giving up weapons of mass
destruction ran thickly through U.S. political rhetoric, yet the end of Gaddafi's WMD
programs were not a result of the War in Iraq. Libya had offered to give up the programs
in secret negotiations with the Clinton Administration in May 1999. The original
surrender was because of a "deepening economic crisis produced by disastrous economic
policies and mismanagement of oil revenues."1xv Because of UN and U.S. sanctions
incurred with the designation as a 'State Sponsor of Terrorism,' it was impossible for
Gaddafi to export oilfield technology or expand oil production, thus reconciliation with
the U.S. government was an economic necessity as opposed to a change of character.
Gaddafi first began to mend his international relations with the Clinton
administration by settling a dispute with Britain over the shooting of the policewoman in
London, followed by a decision to relinquish two Libyans accused in the Lockerbie
bombing for trial in a third country.
Gaddafi offered to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and open their facilities
to inspection during these preliminary talks, and then again in a second meeting in
October of 1999, at which time they also offered to join the Middle East multilateral arms
control talks. "Why did we not pursue the Libyan WMD offer then? Because resolving
the PanAm103 issues was our condition for any further engagement. Moreover, as
Libya's chemical weapons program was not considered an imminent threat and its
nuclear program barley existed, getting Libya out of terrorism and securing compensation
had been top priorities."1xvi From the years of 1999 to 2003, Gaddafi attempted to re-
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enter the international fold because of economic troubles brought about by sanctions, yet
there was no benefit to the U.S political agenda, so there was no perceived need to
discuss Gaddafi or his changes in policy.

"The task of US diplomacy was to

maintain the sanctions until Mr. Gaddafi had fulfilled all other obligations under the UN
resolutions: ending support for terrorism, admitting culpability and compensating
victims' families." 1xvii
The Bush administration created a convenient narrative that constructed
Gaddafi's choice to disarm as a direct result of the War in Iraq, but this narrative
excluded large portions of the story. In Newsweek, Michael Hirsh illuminated the
difference between the story portrayed by Western mediated political rhetoric, showing
the binary between good and evil (noted in italics) as provision of a convenient and
character-based narrative:
removed from its list of

Here is the official story on Libya, which Washington
terror-sponsoring states this week. As the Bush

administration likes to tell it,

Muammar Kaddafi was scared straight by the U.S.

invasion oflraq. On Dec. 19,

2003,just days after Saddam Hussein was hauled from

his spider hole, Kaddafi...

terrorist poster boy from the 1980s .. .gave up his life's work

as an international

terrorist, renouncing both his weapons ofmass destruction and

his terror tactics.

Shocked by the fall of his fellow dictator, Kaddafi turned into as

much a

quivering stoolie as any doomed character on 'The Sopranos ... ' Now the

autocrat

whom Ronald Reagan once called a 'mad dog' has become, in the words of

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 'an important model as nations around the
world press for changes in behavior by Iranian and North Korean regimes.' And
Kaddafi's about face is considered by Bush hard-liners to be a sweet vindication
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of its policy of confronting bad guys without quarter." 1xviii
The language in this article shows how Gaddafi used to be portrayed as evil, crazy
and irrational, and how his construction within the U.S. government has changed to
portray him as an important ally in the region. The italicized comments show the use of
the good versus evil binary in political and new media rhetoric, as well as highlights
Gaddafi's move from one side of that binary to the other.
The political discourse surrounding the move from Iraq to Gaddafi is misleading, as
"the talks with Libya long predated the invasion of Iraq, and they began long before
Tripoli gave up either its terrorist or WMD aspirations."1xix While Gaddafi did change his
foreign policies in 2004, he had been attempting such a change since 1999. Furthermore,
this change in policy was simply that: changes necessary to hasten the removal of
economic sanctions. Gaddafi wanted to change his policy on WMD's in 1999, but was
unable to do so until it was in the best interests of the U.S. government. In 2004, the U.S.
government was able to use this change in rhetoric to not only provide justification for
the War in Iraq, but also for the War on Terror.
The first change in the U.S. government's rhetorical construction was to cite the
2003 decision to remove WMD programs as Gaddafi's reform as sparked by fear of
retaliation similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the time between the
announcement to disband nuclear programs in 2004 to the removal of Libya from the
terrorist sponsor list in 2006, the government took diplomatic steps to ensure a smooth
and unchallenged transition from enemy to ally. On September 21, 2004, President Bush
ended the national emergency between Libya and the United States and lifted most
economic sanctions other than those attached to the designation of a State Sponsor of
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Terror. In Executive Order 13357, the President lifted four sanctions that had been in
place since the late 1980s.1xx
The provisions of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list were originally outlined in
the Act of 1979 (expired in 2001, but renewed in Executive Order 13222, President
Bush), which is maintained by the Secretary of State, who can not do away with any
designation unless the President submits a report to congress that states that there has
either been I) "a fundamental change in leadership and policies of the government, the
government is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and the government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,"
or II) "that the government concerned has not provided any support for international
terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the government concerned has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the
future." 1xxi The Arms Export Control Act of 1994lxxii outlined further restrictions, and
sanctions that remained due to this designation as outlined by the State Department
included a number of bans exports on goods or services that could support military or
terrorist activity. 1xxiii

May 15, 2006, The U.S. State Department announced that it

would restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and would removal Libya from the list
of nations that support terrorism. 1xxiv This action followed Presidential Determination
No. 2006-14 in which President Bush declared that "Libya had not provided any support
for international terrorism during the preceding six months, and had provided assurance
that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future." 1xxv The
determination brought an end to all sanctions once placed upon the country, allowing for
trade to resume between Libya and the Western world. In September 2006, President
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Bush formally ended the trade embargo with Libya, and waived most defense restrictions,
allowing U.S. companies to participate in the destruction of Libya's chemical
weapons. 1xxvi

This removal gave much needed validity to the War on

Terror by showing measurable success of the War on Terror by proposing that
designating Gaddafi as an enemy in this war forced him to change his policies on
terrorism and WMD's. In addition, his removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list
verified the list as a valid diplomatic tool, thus proving a measurable success in the War
on Terror.

The placement ofMuammar al-Gaddafi within a good/evil binary

was an attempt to physically locate the enemies and allies in the Middle East, for the
'terrorist enemy' is not confined to a single concrete locality. The creation of a tangible
enemy required numerous rhetorical tools including the 'Axis of Evil,' the 'Deck of
Cards of the Terrorist Enemy,' and the list of 'State Sponsors of Terrorism,' that
rhetorically aided functioning of the self-Other dichotomy by providing means of
identifying the Other. The existence of these rhetorical tools is further legitimized when
the Other is either defeated or reformed. In the case of Libya, the removal from the list
State Sponsors of Terrorists shows the success of the list, for it shows that not only did a
real threat exist (as shown via its defeat) but that it was the list (via sanctions) that helped
that defeat become a reality. By showing that the list (as a primary tool in the War on
Terror) was successful in stopping support to terrorists, the U.S. government was able to
point to tangible evidence of measurable success in the War on Terror, thus justifying
further violence and the use of the rhetorical tools listed above.
The change in rhetoric allowed the Bush Administration to
justify its foreign policy initiatives, legitimating both violence in Iraq, and in the name of
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the War on Terror. I do not mean here to argue the worth of the sanctions in international
affairs, but to discuss the way that the language surrounding the use of these sanctions
functions to reinforce dominant power structures. The final reason for the change in
rhetoric is oil prices. Libya is an extremely oil-rich country, and by removing economic
sanctions (via removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list) on the country, President
Bush made a huge amount of oil available to U.S. markets, as international oil companies
were able to return to Libya. According to a BBC article from May 2006, "over recent
months there have been moves towards economic reform. U.S. oil companies have
returned to acreage they left in 1986, and firms from around the world are competing
fiercely for new oil and gas contracts."1xxvii An Al Jazeera article stated that oil and gas
reserves are the most important natural resources in Libya and that a 2005 estimate put
Libya's proven oil reserves at 39-40 billion barrels and its natural gas reserves at 52
trillion cubic feet. The article explained that after "Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi
fulfilled all requirements for the lifting of UN, British and US sanctions, Western including U.S. - companies saw a green light to do business in Libya again. Not
surprisingly, the biggest U.S. companies re-entering Libya are from the energy
sector."1xxviii The U.S. companies who re-entered Libya included Marathon Oil Corp,
Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil Corp, and Chevron Corp and Occidental Petroleum
Corp.1xxix

Clearly, the removal of sanctions led to huge opportunity for U.S. business.

Many argue that the driving force behind Operation Iraqi Freedom was oil, and I
believe that it was one of the motivations for removing sanctions on Libya. Research
today widely posits that nonrenewable resources such as oil are directly responsible for
violence and that countries with a natural abundance of a resource such as oil are at
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increased risk of violence. "The abundance of mineral resources is consistently
associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional
development." 1xxx While much of rhetoric surrounding oil is concerned with problems of
scarcity or abundance, other rhetoric is concerned with oil dependency, with marked
difference between the terms of abundance and dependency. "This paper. .. stresses the
vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of
scarcity or abundance. ,,ixxxi While rhetoric of scarcity or abundance talks in terms of the
amount of oil available, rhetoric of dependency is focused on the interpersonal
implications of the global oil market. Whether speaking in terms of abundance or
dependency, Libya's large oil reserves directly increase the amount of violence, both
domestically and internationally:
Beyond increasing the risk of armed conflict by financing and motivating conflicts,
natural resources also increase the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by
weakening the ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts.
Contrary to the widely held belief that abundant resources aid economic growth and
are thus positive for political stability, most empirical evidence suggests that
countries economically dependent on the export of primary commodities are at a
higher risk of political instability and armed conflict."1xxxii
Libya's government is forced into the global market and into international violence
over oil, for "resources are exported into the world economy from numerous peripheral
places. They are worth controlling and fighting over precisely because they are valued in
the global economy." 1xxxiii Because these resources are so valuable to the global market,
all major economic players will be involved in that resources production and exportation,
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thus any country with naturally occurring resources such as Libya are subjected to
international economics, politics, and most importantly, violence.
While the U.S. government rhetorically created a move from evil (WMD's and
terror) to good (accepting Western standards), there has been very little discourse
surrounding the issue of oil apart from various statements in the Western media
proclaiming how much oil is available in Libya, and in what ways this will be good for
the U.S. oil companies. Any rhetoric surrounding the oil issue includes terms such as
'increased diplomacy' and 'opportunity for business,' thus rhetorically constructing an
economic benefit from Gaddafi's transformation to good and ignoring the possibility that
oil dependency may have led to the removal of those sanctions in the first place.
While the change in Gaddafi's international policies, due primarily to economic
crisis placed on Libya by Western sanctions, began to take place as early as 1999, the
change in language surrounding the leader began in December of2003, only IO months
after the United States declared war on Iraq. As the War in Iraq escalated simultaneously
with the War on Terror, the Bush Administration found their rhetoric and declarations
constantly at odds with various critics, and their policies met disapproval from many
sides. The choice of the Bush Administration to allow Gaddafi into the international
arena after rhetorically creating the frame of a reformed sinner was a political move
enacted in the hopes of justifying violence and encouraging the American public to
support War efforts. While it is impossible to prove that three years of sanction removal
and the eventual removal of Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorist list was long-term
plan for the justification of these two wars and their policies, the public discourse
surrounding Gaddafi and Libya has performed that very function.
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Today, the placement of Gaddafi in the good versus evil binary promotes the
narrative that U.S. strength and diplomacy frightened Gaddafi into changing his policies
and converted him the 'good' side of America's fight against weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism. The Western political arena benefited from changing the
rhetorical framework of Gaddafi, for the change from other to self allowed for the
justification of violence against the Iraqi and Afghani people, the legitimization of the
War on Terror and the various associated lists, and increased business between Western
oil companies and Libya due to removal of sanctions. The good/evil binary has been a
useful tool for the U.S. government in achieving political goals, but it is dangerous and
misleading as it leads to the justification of violence and oppression. Although language
of opposition is a cornerstone of Western discourse, its use is infinitely problematic. The
next section of this essay will argue that Gaddafi has been constructed through an everpresent yet faulty binary of good versus evil by illuminating actions of Gaddafi do not
reflect the binary set forth in the texts previously examined.

Section 3: Reversing tlte Binary
In the case ofMuammar-al Gaddafi, political rhetorical constructions present him
as either an enemy or an ally in order to justify questionable political actions. One may
ask "so what?" Every government changes their allies and foes for possibly not-so-sound
political reasons, and here someone who as done not-so-nice things in the past can help
attain certain political goals.
The answer to this is that while a narrative of an evil other turned good proved
successful in attaining a goal, it has done so using the dangerous tool of oppositional
language that provides justification for violence against other human beings based on that
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person's rhetorically constructed 'evilness' and our perceived 'good.' In the case of
Gaddafi, this language allowed for violence against human beings, as well as the
proliferation of Western systems of power and subordination, both in the 1980s and
today. In the 1980s, language of opposition allowed violence against a country whose
leader (I will argue in this section) was in many ways a positive revolutionary against
Western systems of oppression. Today, this language allows a man who has done
extremely bad things to become our ally, and again proliferates Western systems of
power and oppression and justifies violence against our enemy de jour.
In order to illuminate the problem with the binary, I wish to reverse its
construction in order to make clear the 'excluded middle'boodv in which Gaddafi is not
simply evil or simply good, but a human being whose actions may be constructed as
both/and. To eliminate the notion of Gaddafi as good or bad, I will in part reverse the
other-turned-self narrative to illuminate aspects of the Gaddafi government during the
1970s and 1980s that could be viewed as positive (contrary to his past construction as an
enemy), as well as those which could be viewed as negative from the past six years
(contrary to his current construction as a self). James Berlin warns of the first impulse
when confronted with the 'good' versus 'evil' dichotomy "to portray the heroes as
villains and the villains as heroes."1xxxv I am falling prey to this impulse by reversing the
dichotomy, but only with the knowledge that I will further analyze this binary after its
reversal. I do not wish to portray Gaddafi as good in the past or bad today, but only to
illuminate that he is not-- and was never-- one or the other, and to show that reality does
not lie in a binary, but within a middle ground.
To begin this examination, I will examine at examples of Gaddafi's rhetoric and
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actions that displace him from the construction of the evil enemy. This is essentially an
account of Gaddafi's good deeds during the 70s and 80s, when Gaddafi was considered
public enemy number one. I will then investigate examples of Gaddafi's rhetoric and
actions during the past five years that displace him from the construction of the reformed
enemy-turned-ally.
An Ally in the Past

In this section, I will look at Gaddafi's actions and rhetoric spanning over the time
period in which he was rhetorically constructed as an evil enemy by Western politicians.
To do this I will examine a number of Gaddafi's texts, speeches, and personal actions to
displace him from the construction of an evil enemy. When Gaddafi came to power in
1969 at the age of twenty-seven, he wrote his political manifesto, The Green Book In
this work, he outlines his ideal governmental and societal system, as well as his personal
beliefs in Arab and African unity. Because of the great wealth from oil revenues, "by the
late 1970s virtually no Libyan wanted for housing, medical care or transportation, and
'the abolition of need' [called for in Qaddaa's Green Book] was proceeding apace."txxxvi
Gaddafi was "convinced ... of the inherent iniquity of the international order
[and believed that] as a vanguard revolutionary state, Libya should help liberate the rest
of the Third World and reshape its political institutions."1xxxvii He was a self-proclaimed
world revolutionary whose activism spread across North Africa and the Arab nations.
lxxxviii

According to a BBC article,
The main thrust [of the Green Book] was to remove all traces of imported
ideologies like capitalism and communism, and all signs of foreign influence,
before building a new society based on the basic principles of Islam and home-
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grown socialism. As part of this process, corrupt officials were punished and
politically unsound books burned. lxxxix
The Green Book outlined Gaddafi's ideals of a Marxist community with special
attention to equal pay and education: "Society should provide all types of education,
giving people the chance to choose freely any subject they with to learn ... Insufficient
schools restrict man's freedom of choice forcing him to learn the subjects available, while
depriving him of natural right of choice because of the lack of availability of other
subjects."xc Gaddafi attempted to create a fair and equal society, using words such as
fairness, equality, and removal of cruelty. He outlines a society in which people should
help each other and nurture society as a whole.
Gaddafi is a popular African leader who has earned the praise of Nelson Mandela
and others, and is always a prominent figure in various pan-African organizations, such
as the Organization of African Unity (now replaced by the African Union). He is seen as
a humanitarian because he gives large sums of money to sub-Saharan states, and allows
Africans to immigrate to Libya for jobs, and he once said in an interview that Africa "is
closer to me in every way than Iraq or Syria."xci
The vocal support of Mandela in 1997 was a particularly controversial topic.
Mandela declared that is was "our duty to give support to the brother leader, especially in
regards to the sanctions which [were] not hitting just him, they [were] hitting the ordinary
masses of the people ... our African brothers and sisters. ,,,xcii According to an article in
the Final Call Newspaper in 1997, "the Clinton administration stepped up its public
criticism of Mr. Mandela's trip, saying it undermines the international sanctions insisted
upon by this country."xciii While Western politicians perceived Gaddafi as an enemy, one
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of the most respected peacekeepers in the world felt differently.
In the Green Book we find what may have been his greatest humanistic
achievement-- his view on "The Blacks," to whom he dedicates an entire section of his
work. The section begins with the following statement:
THE BLACKS WILL PREVAIL IN THE WORLD. The latest age of slavery is
the white race's enslavement of the black race. The black man will not forget this
until he has achieved rehabilitation. This tragic and historic event, the resulting
bitter feeling, and the search for satisfaction derived from rehabilitating a whole
race, constituting a psychological motivation in the movement of the black race to
vengeance and domination, which cannot be disregarded. Added to that is the
inevitability of the social historical cycles including the tallow race's domination
of the world when it marched from Asia against the rest of the continents. Then
came the role of the white race, when it carried out a wide-ranging colonialist
movement covering all the continents of the world. Now comes the black race's
tum to prevail. xciv
Gaddafi is one of the few leaders who writes directly about the rise of the Black
race, arguing that a "backward social situation ... helps to bring about numerical
superiority of the blacks because their low standard of living has protected them from
getting to know the means and ways of birth control and family planning ... leading to
their unlimited growth." xcv While his explanation the Black race seems racist by
American standards, with statements such as, "the blacks ... are sluggish in a climate
which is always hot,"xcvi Gaddafi is seen in Africa as an avid supporter of the Black race.
In terms ofrace, Gaddafi provides and interesting foil to the Western notion of the
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enemy. He is neither completely Black nor completely Arab in appearance, making it
difficult to rhetorically pigeonhole his identity based on his physicality. Because of this,
Western rhetoricians must focus on his 'garish' clothes and 'outlandish' personality when
constructing him as an enemy. In addition, the fact that as a supporter of the Black race,
and as someone who appears to be partially Black, makes it more difficult to completely
construct him as an Other because in our time of political correctness, U.S. government
officials can not speak about direct subordination of his ideals of Black domination. At
the same time, it will be difficult to completely construct him as a self because the space
of Western dominance is inherently White.
Gaddafi is also an important figure in the Arab world. In one of his more recent
writings called the White Book,xcvii Gaddafi envisioned and described step-by-step the
solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict which he called "Irastin," a bi-national single
state for Palestinians and Jews. "Col. Gaddafi won some respect for having the courage
to speak his mind without fear. He has generally struck a common chord, for example, in
denouncing the deals that a number of Arab leaders have struck with Israel as a shameful
sell-out."xcviii This space of pan-Arabism is tricky when attempting to construct Gaddafi
as either a self or an Other, for with the same actions on Gaddafi's part, he can be
constructed as an enemy who is attempting to unite the Arab states against the West, or as
an ally who is, like the West, striving for global peace.
Ultimately in his rhetoric and actions, Gaddafi's revolutionary ideas and socialist
ideologies position him counter to many U.S. ideologies such as democracy and
capitalism. As such, he embodies the Otherness with which Western politicians had
constructed him in his call to revolt against all Western dominance, making it easy for
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Western politicians to construct their view of him as an enemy/Other.
Guy Arnold writes of the revolutionary heroism of Gaddafi in The Maverick

State, explaining that while most military takeovers that occurred in the Third World
since the 1950s were about power and control, that "Gaddafi and the group of young
officers who seized power in 1969 were real revolutionaries in their desire to alter the
fundamental balance of their society."xcix Gaddafi's three primary principles of
revolution include political, economic and social freedom, national and pan-Arab unity,
and Islamic socialism that eliminates class differences and promotes social justice.c The
principles on which Gaddafi bases his government are that of an ideal utopia of socialist
society, a description which entirely contradicts the Western construction of an irrational
and evil Other. Yet, his ideals run counter to Western ideals of capitalism and
democracy, and he is an active revolutionary against the spread of these ideals, making
him a threat to the dominant power structure that the West wishes to uphold.
While seemingly a positive influence in the Middle East
and Africa, so why did the Reagan administration rhetorically construct Gaddafi as an
evil Other? Noam Chomsky, an expert on the topic of Libya, concludes that the Gulf of
Sidra (the conflict over territorial waters) was a trap, "presumably with the expectation
that it might incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans."ci This expectation was
met with the bombing of La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, which was "immediately
blamed on Libya."cii The response to this was the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in Operation
El Dorado Canyon which Chomsky explains were, "carefully planned so that they would
begin precisely at 7 p.m. Eastern Standard Time," making this the "first bombing in
history staged for prime time television."ciii In addition, an hour before the bombings
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occurred, a report from Berlin came out announcing little to no evidence for Libyan
involvement in the discotheque bombing. This went unreported in U.S. media, and two
hours before the scheduled attack, Reagan stated that, "our evidence is direct, it is
precise, and it is irrefutable." civ
The Libyan terrorist threat in the 1980s differed greatly from the Reagan
administration's construction. Chomsky quotes two commentators who reviewed the
case of Libyan terror as stating that "the striking feature of Libyan atrocities is that they
are the only ones whose numbers are sufficiently limited that the individual cases can be
enumerated."cv Yet, the administration was able to create an enemy out of Gaddafi, for
"Libya's terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the was of U.S. plans in
North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere ... these are real crimes which must be
punished."cvi
During the 1980s, Gaddafi was a revolutionary who posed a threat to U.S.
ideologies and international political initiatives, thus incurring a rhetorical construction
that portrayed him as an evil enemy. In many ways, Gaddafi represents Hardt and
Negri's description of the revolutionary, the voice of the subjugated minority hoping to
rise above the oppressive forces of the United States.
In Bin Laden's Last Stand, David B. Edwards highlights the fact that a person
perceived as an enemy by one audience may not be seen as an enemy to audiences who
are not subjected to the oppositional language, saying that, "While the administration has
been trying to isolate bin Laden rhetorically, we also hear reports that the al Qaeda leader
is viewed very differently by many in the Middle East and South Asia. News reports
make it clear that many see bin Laden as a hero on horseback, intent on righting the
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wrongs committed against the Muslim people." cvii This is also true for Muammar alGaddafi, who some see as a committed revolutionary for the causes of the Middle East
and Africa against the oppression of Western power structures.

An "Enemy" Today
According to his past actions and ideologies, Gaddafi can easily be constructed as
a visionary revolutionary and a voice for regions of the world historically dominated by
the West, or if nothing else, at least a man who was unduly constructed as an enemy
during the 1980s. Just as some of Gaddafi's actions and rhetoric in the 1980s directly
contradict the Reagan Administration's construction of his as an enemy, many of his
actions in the past six years directly contradict the Bush Administration's construction of
him as a reformed sinner.
This section examines how well Gaddafi fits into this new construction of
reformed sinner, the enemy-turned-ally. Michael Hirsh asks, "just what kind of 'model'
is Libya really? It's certainly not a model for Bush's democracy campaign ... although the
administration is now touting the idea that diplomatic relations with Libya will give
Washington more leverage in pressing for internal reform, this is blatant nonsense."cviii
A number of political groups in and outside of Libya agree with this conclusion,
and voice their opinions on numerous websites that protest Gaddafi. These organizations
include the National Conference of the Libyan Opposition,cix the National Front for the
Salvation of Libya, ex the Committee for Libyan National Action in Europe, and the
Libyan League for Human Rights.cxi There is also a website that actively pursues the
overthrow of Gaddafi called StopGaddafi.org, which was set up in 2006 and lists 343
Libyans who the site claims are victims of murder and political assassination at the hands
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of Gaddafi, as well as 59 foreign nationals who are listed as having met the same fate.cxii
The U.S. government has also noted Gaddafi's recent bad behavior. On
September 10, 2004, President Bush "determined in Presidential determination No 200444 that (1) Libya had violated terms of the Arms Export Control Act by receiving nuclear
enrichment equipment, material or technology from Khan Laboratories in Pakistan, but
that (2) implementation of the sanctions required under the Arms Export Control Act
"would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests." In addition, Bush
determined that new restrictions on Export-Import Bank support to U.S. exporters
pursuing business in Libya were not in the national interest of the United States.
According to this information, it would seem that sanctions should be re-imposed, but it
was not in the best political interest of the U.S. Bush overlooked Libya's dealings with
A.Q. Kahn so that Libya could move toward removal from the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism allowing the application of the new construction of Gaddafi as good.
According to the U.S. Department of State's annual human rights report for 2005,
"the government's performance remained poor, although it took some steps to improve its
human rights record."cxiii
Libya's human rights violations are listed by the report as: inability of citizens to
change the government; torture; poor prison conditions; impunity; arbitrary arrest
and incommunicado detention; lengthy political detention; denial of fair public
trial; infringement of privacy rights; severe restriction of civil libertiesDfreedom
of speech, press, assembly, and association; restriction of freedom of religion;
corruption and lack of government transparency; societal discrimination against
women, ethnic minorities, and foreign workers; trafficking in persons; and
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restriction of labor rights. cxiv
According to the report, the Libyan state controls the Judiciary, and there is no right to a
fair public trial. In addition, the government prohibits independent human rights
organizations from entering the country, ethnic and tribal minorities suffer
discrimination, and domestic violence against women appears to be widespread. cxv The
report stated that torture is a problem within the government, and that:
The law prohibits such practices, but security personnel routinely tortured
prisoners during interrogations or as punishment. Government agents reportedly
detained and tortured foreign workers, particularly those from sub-Saharan
Africa. Reports of torture were difficult to corroborate since many prisoners were
held incommunicado. The reported methods of torture included chaining
prisoners to a wall for hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying
corkscrews to the back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and
allowing the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags,
deprivation of food and water, hanging by the wrists, suspension from a pole
inserted between the knees and elbows, cigarette bums, threats of dog attacks, and
beatings on the soles of the feet. cxvi
Gaddafi's social system does not meet Western standards for human rights, and
upon reading the above assessment, most those who consider themselves 'humane' by
Western standards would have trouble identifying Gaddafi as a self. Freedom House,cxvii
which ranks civil liberties by nation, graded Libya at the lowest possible level of
freedom. In 2006, it rated Libya a seven for both Civil Liberties and Political Rights,
with one standing for the most free countries and seven standing for the least free.
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Overall, Libya was given a rating of "Not Free" in 2006, with no indication of change
for the better. cxviii
The Western media recently covered the case of the six foreign health workers
(five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor) who were accused of deliberately
infecting 426 children with HIV-tainted blood in a Libyan hospital in 1999. On May 6,
2004, a Libyan court sentenced the workers to death, but international observers believe
that the confessions of the health workers were forced either by torture or by some other
method.cxix The Country Report (another human rights organization) of2005 stated that,
"according to Amnesty Internationals and Human Rights Watch, the foreign medical
personnel charged with deliberately infecting children in a hospital in Benghazi reported
that they had been tortured through electric shock and beatings to extract their
confessions."cxx These reported violations directly contradict the U.S. government's
construction of Gaddafi as a self who by definition is rational, kind, and humane, thus
making it hard to conceive of him as a reformed enemy.
Upon the removal of Libya from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and the
subsequent removal of various sanctions, the House of Representatives passed House
Resolution g3gcxxi which urged the Secretary of State to require that the Libyan
government settle all financial obligations pertaining to the Pan Am Flight 101 and show
a clear move toward ending all terrorist activities. The resolution noted that in 2002 the
Government of Libya offered $2.7 billion to settle claims by the families of the 270
people killed aboard Pan Am Flight 103, representing $10 million for each victim of the
Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. On August 15, 2003, Libya's embassy accepted
"responsibility for the action of its officials"cxxii in relation to the Lockerbie bombing. On
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May 24, 2006, Congressman Mike Ferguson stated, "[To date,] the families of the
victims of Pan Am Flight 103 have not yet received the final $2 million payment
promised by the Government ofLibya."cxxiii
According to a New York Times article published on July 8, 2006, Gaddafi had yet
to begin the promised payback, although the payments were supposed to have been made
before Libya was officially removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list on June
30, 2006. The article stated that upon the promise of the payments in August 2003, the
Libyan government opened up a Swiss bank account from which the first $4 million out
of a promised total of $10 million per victim was released in September 2003 when the
United Nations sanctions were lifted, and then another $4 million in 2004 when the U.S.
sanctions were lifted. With the removal of Libya from the list, Libya was expected to
immediately pay the final $2 million, but a Libyan lawyer representing his country was
quoted in a press release saying that, "the settlement agreement expired, and the Escrow
Account agreement also came to an end. Consequently, the remaining amount for which
the corresponding condition had not been fulfilled was returned to its source."cxxiv The
removal of Libya from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism was contingent upon his
payment to the families, so his refusal to pay directly conflicts with the portrayal of
Gaddafi as a reformed sinner.
One newspaper noted that his internal policies remain questionable, saying that
"committees around the country nominally hold power, while real power still rests in the
hands of the country's veteran leader ... Col Gaddafi is intent, perhaps, to ensure that his
idiosyncratic years as leader are left as a stamp on the country by the rise to power and
possible succession of one of his sons. ,,cxxv Gaddafi' s governmental system is that of a de
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facto ruler who has complete control of all aspects of the government. This type of
government runs directly counter to American ideals of freedom and democracy, thus
providing yet another foil to the construction of Qaddafi as a self.
The New York Times a reported that there is no sign of a governmental change in
Libya, and quoted Qaddafi as "urging his supporters ... to 'kill enemies' if they asked for
political change"cxxvi at a rally marking the 3ih anniversary of his coup d'etat in August
2006. This action did not fall within the binary constructed by Western political rhetoric,
for "Colonel Qaddafi said those who hoped for political change in Libya saw its people
as 'ignorant and immature. ,,,cxxvii The article quotes Qaddafi as saying:
Our revolution has won. The whole world accepts our revolutionary project as it
benefits all peoples across the world. Our enemies have been crushed inside
Libya, and you have to be ready to kill them if they emerge anew. Our political
path is the correct one, as it grants freedom to the whole people, sovereignty,
power and wealth to the whole people. (added by the journalist: referring to
Libya's Jamahiriya direct democracy system, which opposes Western liberal
democracy and criminalizes the creation of opposition parties.) If the enemy
shows up, you must finish it off because the enemy appears to exterminate you.
We cannot tolerate that the enemy undermines the power and the people and the
revolution. ,,cxxviii
A contradiction appeared again on November 19, 2006, when A CNN article
reported that Qaddafi was supporting the leader of Sudan in refusing Western
intervention to stop the mass genocide in Darfour. Qaddafi was reported to have
"accused the West of trying to grab Sudan's oil wealth with its plan to send U.N. troops to
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Darfur and urged Khartoum to reject them."cxxix In this instance, we are faced with a new
ally acting as the conceived enemy would act:
Gadhafi is a longstanding opponent of the International Criminal Court in The
Hague, which he has dismissed as a dispenser of victors' and colonizers' justice.
Gadhafi accused the West of wanting to defeat his plan to construct a single
African federal government in a so-called United States of Africa to maintain its
economic dominance. 'The West exploits tribalism, sectarianism and [skin] color
to feed war, which leads to backwardness and Western intervention in a number
of countries," he said on Sunday. 'All the conflicts in Africa are caused by
colonialism, which does not want the rise of the United States of Africa and
works for division and interference and for military coups. ,,,cxxx
Another disturbing fact is that there is evidence that Gaddafi has recently made
deals with A.Q. Khan, the infamous nuclear weapons dealer. This, compounded with
reports of revolting human rights violations, the refusal to pay the families of the
Lockerbie victims, and an apparent lack of change in the regime, all contradict the
Western construction of Gaddafi as someone who has reformed to become "good." For a
man who Western political discourse has recently been constructed as a reformed
evildoer who promised great hope for diplomacy in the Middle East, Gaddafi certainly
does not always espouse such ideals.cxxxi What the reader is left with is an unclear and
muddled picture of Gaddafi, confusing the Western thinker who is used to narratives
shaped by binaries.
An official document from the U.S. State Department written on November 30,
1999, quotes Ambassador Ronald Neumann as listing a litany of changes Gaddafi had
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made, all of which point to changes for good, but Neumann warns at this time to:
Exercise caution and to emphasize the need for changes in Libyan behavior before
it is reintegrated into the world community. We have argued that Libya's past
history of support for terrorism and intervention outside its borders cannot simply
be forgotten, and that trust needs to be based on a consistent pattern of altered
behavior and concrete actions."cxxxii
Neumann states that he has "drawn for you a mixed picture, in which Libya has begun to
take important positive steps to renounce terror and support peace, but continues to sound
the bell of long-term opposition to the U.S." cxxxiii
And so we are left with a confusing mixed picture, yet as confusing as it may be,
it is the most accurate construction of Gaddafi. During the 1980s, Gaddafi was
constructed as an irrational, evil enemy, and today he is constructed as a reformed sinner
who, from a change of character, has become a rational, humane ally. Yet both
constructions eliminate or ignore important facts, highlighting only what is useful to the
current construction. This ignored middle ground appears to us a confusing mess of facts
and opinions, but without it we are left with war rhetoric that leads to the subjugation of
difference and violent revolt against the system of oppression that we have produced. The
examination of the 'multiple rhetorics' that lie between the two poles of a binary leads to
greater understanding of human conflict, a greater acceptance of difference, and reduces
the risk of justifying violence. This is particularly true for the construction of Gaddafi
through the binary of good versus evil, for this construction has fostered unquestioned
justification of violence enacted by the U.S. on the grounds of fighting terrorism and
nuclear proliferation.
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Conclusion:
St. Augustine tells the story ofa pirate captured by Alexander the Great, who
asked him "how he dares molest the sea." "How dare you molest the whole
world?" The pirate replied: "Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a
thief; you, doing it with a great nary, are called an emperor.

ncxxxiv

- Noam Chomsky; Pirates and Emperors
For the past several decades, the U.S. has transitioned from a nation-state created
through revolution, to one of several global superpowers, arriving today as the most
powerful force in global politics and conflict. As the proverbial emperor, the U. S.
government is able to accuse the pirates of crime that it itself is guilty of committing, and
justifies this using the classic binary of good versus evil. This binary is an inherently
exclusive system, breaking groups of people into two polar opposites and ignoring the
"excluded middle"cxxxv that paints the complexities and varieties of human interaction.
Language of opposition promotes cultural hegemony and furthers oppressive power
structures, and is dangerous both in its use to justify violence and in its tendency to
promote subjugating systems of power, yet it remains a common rhetorical tool in
Western language, perhaps for these very reasons. The use of such oppositional language
has become increasingly perilous as it justifies violence in a time where nuclear weapons
threaten the existence of humankind.
As the world's single, unchecked superpower, the U.S. government attempts to
reify the present system of power in which it rules supreme, with a large part of this
process found in the rhetorical construction used to create enemies, who, framed as evil
Others, threaten the emperor's powerful hold. This rhetorical system allows the
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American audience to readily accept disgusting acts of violence against perceived others
without reflection or thought.
Unfortunately, the binary is inevitable, for it is through difference that we make
meaning of our lives, and our situatedness in relation to other people, cxxxvi but binaries are
dangerous because they over-simplify that difference. Thus, understanding of the enemy
as human is replaced with a singular identification of the enemy as evil. These supposed
evil enemies are rhetorically created with the binary of good versus evil that eliminates
any middle ground, yet it is within the middle ground, as explored in this paper with the
case of Gaddafi, that we find that the binary is essentially flawed.
This theme has been addressed in academic writing concerned with the War on
Terror and the War in Iraq, and has been explored to understand how enemies such as
Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein are rhetorically created, but the case of Gaddafi was
ultimately ignored by both academicians and the news media. This paper is limited to the
case study, but it raises the question as to why, in the summer of 2006, the world barley
batted an eye when a man who was once constructed to be public enemy number one was
declared to have reformed his ways, and his country no longer considered a sponsor of
terrorism. While the U.S. government's rhetorical strategy is understandable, why did
the U.S. press comply in disseminating this rhetoric? Was it apathy, or did the press
already have enough bad guys to fill the news reel? What about the American public?
Are we so impressionable that we will consume any rhetorical frame fed to us by the
media? Or were we so relieved to hear that at least one enemy is gone that we dared not
question lest it be false? Was the lack of notice due to good public relations, or does the
American public not care to question? These are all crucial questions that I urge the
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reader to think about further.
While the reason behind the lack of notice can not be answered, this essay was
intt<nded to add one more case to the pile of examples of the U.S. government justifying
violence through purely rhetorical means. In the case of Libya, government officials
were able to first create an enemy (and thus was justified in violence against him), and a
mere twenty years later, able to construct the same man as an ally using the same
rhetorical construct. While this kind of rhetoric is clearly useful politically, it is
dangerous because in justifying violence, it allows the audience to cease questioning the
action. It makes war easy to accept, including civilian and soldier casualties on both
sides of the conflict. Yet upon closer inspection of the middle ground destroyed by the
binary, we find these binaries to be flawed, and our justifications weak. We find that the
conflicts are not black and white, and our enemies to be merely humans whose opinions
differ from our own. We find not a madman, but a politician, a man who has done good
deeds along with the bad, a man who has not at all reformed his ways. We find in the
case ofMuammar al-Gaddafi, along with others who have been placed in the U.S. binary
of the enemy, that the evil enemy of Gaddafi was a construct presented to us by the
government via the news media aimed at attaining specific political goals.
The U.S. government uses language of opposition in order to maintain global
power, when it should accept and aim to understand counter violence and attempt to
reduce its own systems of domination. We see this played out in the case of Gaddafi, as
the United States uses the rhetorical tool of the binary to repress counter-violence in order
to maintain dominance in the world order.
As lines between nation-states are de-constructed through revolt, differences
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between people will become space for free and constant debate that will keep any one
group from rising to leadership. What is imagined in the postmodern imagination is a
broad and free-flowing world of international citizenship, marked by a distinct decrease
in the power of the nation-state and an underlying acceptance of difference. cxxxvii Thus,
we must look for a new narrative for understanding human conflict that embraces
difference, for the suppression of difference will eventually lead to revolt on a grand
scale.

While the use of binaries will continue to exist and function in human

discourse, it is the duty of the receivers of this rhetoric to increase their awareness of
these constructs and question rhetorical foundation upon with they are based. It is my
sincere hope that the American people will constantly question the binaries that
discursively subordinate others and perpetuate systems of oppression and violence, and
will eventually discover productive discursive practices that embrace differences, lead to
nonviolent conflict resolution and aid in the movement toward a peaceful postmodern
global community.
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